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Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
I. INTRODUCTION
Public housing recently has become a major target of civil rights
groups intent on the integration of American society.' Their focus
1. Among the major litigational efforts to alter metropolitan racial pat-
terns by bringing public housing to the suburbs is a recent United
States Supreme Court case, Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.
Dev. Corp., 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977). In 1971 the Metropolitan Housing
Development Corporation, a nonprofit corporation, applied to the vil-
lage of Arlington Heights for the rezoning of a 15-acre parcel from
single-family to multi-family classification. The housing project had
federal assistance under § 236 of the National Housing and Urban De-
velopment Act of 1968, 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (1970), and would have
been a first in Arlington Heights. According to a 1970 census, only
27 of the Village's 64,000 residents were black. Pursuant to the mu-
nicipalities' comprehensive plans, the city trustees denied the request
for a zoning change. Consequently, the Metropolitan Housing Devel-
opment Corporation and three minority members potentially eligible
to live in housing projects, brought suit in United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, alleging that the denial was ra-
cially discriminatory and that it violated, inter alia, the fourteenth
amendment and the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619
(1970). The trustees denied that racial motivation played any part
in the denial decision. The trustees claimed they were legitimately
exercising the discretionary power to protect property values and the
integrity of the zoning ordinances granted to them by Arlington
Heights' comprehensive plan.
The issues before the United States Supreme Court on appeal were
whether a municipality, according to the dictates of its comprehensive
housing plan, can refuse to rezone a site for public housing when such
action effectually forecloses the construction of any low-income hous-
ing, and whether such action violates the Fair Housing Act and the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. In an historic
decision the Court held that the racially disproportionate impact of
the Village's refusal to grant a zoning change necessary to allow the
construction of a low-income housing project, was not sufficient, ab-
sent evidence of a racially discriminatory motivation to prove a viola-
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has been on the formulation and enforcement of the nation's fair
housing laws. On April 20, 1976, the United States Supreme Court
reasserted the power of the federal courts to order the location of
low-income public housing, largely benefiting racial minorities,
in the suburbs of a large metropolitan area.2 The decision affirmed
a ruling by the Seventh Circuit 3 that the Department of Housing
and Urban Development 4 lawfully could be ordered by a federal
district court to provide housing for low-income individuals in the
suburban areas surrounding Chicago.5 The order was based on a
determination that HUD had fostered racial segregation by sup-
porting a racially discriminatory city housing authority plan.6
Housing disparity based on race has been recognized as "the
most serious domestic problem facing America today."7 A poten-
tial solution to this problem is the location of low-income public
housing in the suburban areas of large cities. The majority of
federal subsidized housing, intended for occupancy by individuals
of low and moderate income, has been built in city core areas where
there is a high concentration of minority populations. This type
of public housing pattern has contributed to the development of
tion of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Cit-
ing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976), with approval, the
Court made it clear that official action will not be held unconstitu-
tional solely because it results in a racially disproportionate impact.
"'Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touch-
stone of an invidious racial discrimination.' . . . Proof of racially dis-
criminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause . . . ." 97 S. Ct. at 563.
The Court's ruling in Arlington Heights effectively limits the scope
of the federal courts' ability to assist blacks and other minorities in
funding housing in predominately white communities, as zoning laws
are effective against public housing. This is especially important to
the Court's decision in Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976). If a
suburb has a prior zoning plan which excludes public housing, then
the Department of Housing and Urban Development cannot carry out
the order entered in Gautreaux. The Court has effectively limited
public housing in Chicago to the less affluent suburbs.
2. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
3. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 503 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1974).
4. Hereinafter referred to as HUD.
5. The court of appeals remanded the case to the district court for further
consideration of a possible metropolitan relief plan. The United States
Supreme Court affirmed stating: "Since we conclude, that a metro-
politan area remedy in this case is not impermissible as a matter of
law, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals remanding the
case 'for additional evidence and for further consideration of the issue
of metropolitan area relief.'" 425 U.S. at 306.
6. 503 F.2d at 931.
7. Id. at 938.
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metropolitan areas where the core city is populated primarily by
minority groups and the suburbs are inhabited predominately by
whites.8
In any solution to this problem, there is an inherent conflict
over whether public housing should be built in the central city
or the suburbs. On the one hand, there are those who maintain
that low-income public housing is needed in the rapidly deteriorat-
ing city cores, because the majority of low-income minority popu-
lations already live there. They are joined by those in the suburbs
who object to the location of public housing in their neighborhoods.
On the other hand, there is the view adopted by the majority of
federal courts, that to provide decent housing for low-income
minority populations, public housing is needed in both urban and
suburban areas. HUD's role in the development of public housing
is to approve or reject funding for publicly and privately spon-
sored proposals for public housing. Consequently, when HUD ap-
proves low-income projects in the core areas of cities, the already
established segregated housing patterns are reinforced. Converse-
ly, projects initiated in the suburbs of a metropolitan area poten-
tially have the effect of breaking down the segregated housing
pattern. 9
The question before the Supreme Court in Gautreaux was
whether the district court had authority to order HUD to remedy
a segregated housing pattern by taking affirmative remedial action
affecting the suburban areas outside the city limits of Chicago.10
In finding such authority in this public housing segregation case,
the Court resolved two crucial questions raised by similar school-
desegregation cases, particularly Milliken v. Bradley." The first
question considered was whether Milliken, in a public housing con-
text, would deny the use of a remedy which transcended the bound-
aries of political subdivisions, where there had not been a finding
of an intermunicipal constitutional violation.'2 The second ques-
tion raised by Milliken was whether the imposition of metropolitan
area relief would "impermissibly interfere with local governments
and suburban housing authorities that have not been implicated in
HUD's unconstitutional conduct. ' 13
8. For statistics of the ratio of blacks to whites in one Chicago suburb,
see note 1 supra.
9. See Maxwell, HUD's Project Selection Criteria-A Cure for "Imper-
missible Color Blindniess"? 48 NoTRE DAmr LAw. 92 (1972).
10. 425 U.S. at 296.
11. 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (reversing a lower court decision ordering an in-
terdistrict remedy).
12. 425 U.S. at 292.
13. Id. at 300.
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II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1966, six blacks, who were either tenants or applicants for
public housing in Chicago, brought separate class actions against
the Chicago Housing Authority 14 and HUD.15 The complaint filed
against CHA charged that the housing authority had violated 42
U.S.C. sections 1981 and 198216 and the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment by maintaining site selection and tenant
assignment procedures based on racial separation criteria.1" It
was alleged that, in selecting public housing sites, CHA" 'avoid [ed]
the placement of negro families in white neighborhoods.' "18 The
plaintiffs sought equitable relief in the form of an injunction to
restrain CHA from discriminatory practices' 9 and affirmative reme-
dial action to correct the past and future effects of the unconstitu-
tional site-selection and tenant assignment procedures.2 0  The con-
templated remedial action was construction of future public housing
units in predominately white areas within Chicago.
2 1
On February 10, 1969, the district court entered a summary
judgment against CHA.22 The district court found that CHA had
violated the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs by maintaining
a practice of selecting public housing sites2 3 and assigning tenants
14. Hereinafter referred to as CHA.
15. 425 U.S. at 286.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right in every State and Territory to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the
full and equal benefits of all laws and proceedings for the se-
curity of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens,
and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties,
taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970) provides: "All citizens of the United States
shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed
by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and con-
vey real and personal property."
17. 425 U.S. at 286. "The complaint filed . . . alleged that between 1950
and 1965 substantially all of the sites for family public housing se-
lected by CHA ... were 'at the time of selection, and are now,' located
'within the areas known as the Negro Ghetto.'" Id.
18. Id.
19. 503 F.2d at 932.
20. Id. at 931.
21. Id.
22. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
23. Id. at 913-14. Under Illinois law, housing authorities are provided
with certain criteria for choosing sites for public housing. ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 67h, § 8.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976), provides several fac-
tors for the housing authority to consider in selecting a site, including:
[E]limination of unsafe and unsanitary dwellings, the clearing
and redevelopment of blighted and slum areas, the assembly
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on the basis of race.2 4 The evidence submitted to the district court
clearly showed that the public housing system was racially seg-
regated. According to the plaintiffs' statistics there were only four
projects having white majorities within Chicago and all were lo-
cated in predominately white areas. Of the remaining housing
projects, with nonwhite majorities, 99 per cent of the family
units were located in areas of Chicago which were or would soon
be substantially all black.25  Although there was not an explicit
finding that housing officials were motivated by "racial animus,"26
the district court held that CHA intentionally had fostered a pro-
gram of public housing which resulted in "de jure' 27 racial dis-
of improved and unimproved land for development or rede-
velopment purposes, the conservation and rehabilitation of ex-
isting housing, and the provision of decent, safe, and sanitary
housing accommodations.
Id.
The plaintiffs alleged that the procedure under which CHA oper-
ated had the effect of maintaining existing patterns of residential seg-
regation. Under the procedure CHA would informally submit poten-
tial sites to a city council alderman in whose ward the potential site
was located. The alderman then allegedly vetoed the sites because
the large percentage of blacks on the waiting list would create a black
population in a white area, if the housing was constructed. As a con-
sequence of this type of action 99 % of the submitted housing sites
located in white areas were vetoed while only 10% of the proposed
sites located in black areas were rejected. 296 F. Supp. at 910.
24. 296 F. Supp. at 909. The district court found that CHA had imposed
racial quotas at four white family housing projects to keep the number
of black families at a minimum. The blacks' population in the four
white majority projects was between 1% and 7% of the total popula-
tion. Conversely, 90% of the total number of tenants living in the
CHA projects were black and 90% of the people on the waiting list
were black. In fact, the CHA officials testified that they employed
"elastic quotas," which resulted in white tenant preference for white
majority projects. Id.
25. Id. at 910. The statistics (excluding the four white projects) estab-
lished, that 92% of all the family units were in neighborhoods that
were at least 75% black and two-thirds in areas that were at least
95% black. Id.
26. Id. at 914. The district court noted that the racial character of the
neighborhood was never an explicit factor in CHA's selection of a
housing site. In fact, most of the sites selected were chosen primarily
"to further the praiseworthy and urgent goals of low cost housing and
urban renewal." Id. It was apparent that the CHA board members
were under severe pressure from their constituents to follow a policy
of keeping blacks out of white neighborhoods. Id.
27. In Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1969), the district court
stated that de jure segregation means "segregation specifically man-
dated by law or by public policy pursued under color of law," and
that de facto segregation results "from the action of pupil assignment
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crimination.2 s The district court specifically rejected the argument
offered by CHA that a history of racial tension and threats of vio-
lence justified a policy of racial segregation.29
To implement its decision, the district court, on July 1, 1969,
entered a judgment order granting equitable relief to the plain-
tiffs for the purpose of prohibiting future violations and remedying
the effects of past unconstitutional practices.80 The district court
ordered CHA to construct at least 700 family units in the predomi-
nately white areas of Chicago before any units could be built in
minority areas. 31  It was further directed that CHA, after con-
struction of the first 700 units, locate at least 75 per cent of any
new public housing projects in predominately white areas in Chi-
cago.32 CHA also was ordered to modify its site-selection and
policies not based on race but upon social or other conditions for which
government cannot be held responsible." Id. at 493.
In Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), the Court
stated: "[W]e emphasize that the differentiating factor between de-
jure segregation and so-called de facto segregation ...is purpose or
intent to segregate." Id. at 208.
28. 296 F. Supp. at 913-14. The district court in response to the extensive
amount of statistical data submitted by the plaintiffs, stated:
The statistics on the family housing sites considered during
the five major programs show a very high probability, a near
certainty, that many sites were vetoed on the basis of the ra-
cial composition of the site's neighborhood. In the face of
these figures, CHA's failure to present a substantial or even
a speculative indication that racial criteria were not used enti-
tles plaintiffs to judgment as a matter of law. . . . The addi-
tional evidence of intent, composed mostly of uncontradicted
admissions by CHA officials, also establishes plaintiffs' right
to judgment as a matter of law either considered alone or in
combination with the statistics.
Id. at 913.
29. Id. at 909.
30. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 304 F. Supp. 736, 737 (N.D. Ill.
1969).
31. Id. at 738.
32. Id. The district court's plan divided Cook County into a "General
Public Housing Area" and a "Limited Public Housing Area." CHA
was prohibited from building any new units within the "Limited Pub-
lic Housing Area" unless certain specified conditions were satisfied.
Id. The "Limited Public Housing Area" was defined as "that part of
the County of Cook in the State of Illinois which lies either within
census tracts ...having 30% or more non-white population, or within
a distance of one mile from any point on the outer perimeter of any
such census tract." Id. at 737. The "General Public Housing Area"
consisted of the remaining part of Cook County. Id. After the first
700 units were into the actual construction stage in the "General Pub-
lic Housing Area," CHA was permitted to locate up to 33% of its "Gen-
eral Public Housing Area" dwelling units outside the City of Chicago.
Id. at 739.
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tenant assignment procedures to conform with the purposes of the
judgment order.33 CHA did not file an appeal from this judgment
order.
At the same time that the suit was filed against CHA, the plain-
tiffs filed a complaint against the Secretary of the Department of
Housing and Urban Development. However, the action against
HUD was stayed until resolution of the action against CHA.34 The
plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that HUD had "'assisted
in the carrying on . . . of a racially discriminatory public housing
system within the City of Chicago'" in the form of financial as-
sistance for CHA's discriminatory housing projects.35 The com-
plaint asked that HUD be enjoined "from making available to the
Chicago Housing Authority any federal financial assets to be used
in connection with or in support of the racially discriminatory as-
pects of the Chicago public housing system."' 6 On September 1,
33. Id. The judgment order contained two affirmative directives:
A. CHA shall use its best efforts to increase the supply of
Dwelling Units as rapidly as possible in conformity with
the provisions of this judgment order ....
B. CHA is hereby permanently enjoined from invidious dis-
crimination on the basis of race in the conduct or opera-
tion of its public housing systems.
Id. at 741. The district court retained exclusive jurisdiction over the
case and the power to issue and enforce supplemental orders "for all
purposes . . . upon proper notice and motion, of orders modifying or
supplementing the terms of this order." Id. CHA did not file an ap-
peal from this judgment order; although it was later affirmed by the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit after CHA had refused to
offer any plans for proposed sites to the Chicago City Council as re-
quired by statute. See Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 436 F.2d
306 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 922 (1971).
Under Illinois law, CHA was required to submit proposed family
housing sites to the Chicago Planning Commission and the Chicago
City Council. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, §§ 11, 12, 4.1; ch. 67 § 9
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976). Besides th6 original judgment order, the
district court found it necessary to enter five supplemental orders.
436 F.2d at 308. Subsequently after a series of conferences concerning
the delay of submission of any proposed family unit sites for approval,
the district court on July 20, 1970, entered a new judgment order modi-
fying the "best efforts" provision of the July 1, 1969 order. The order
directed that the proposed 'ites be submitted to the city council in
accordance with a specific timetable. CHA appealed this subsequent
order, arguing that because of community hostility and political con-
siderations the delay in submission was justified. The court of appeals
held that these justifications were properly rejected by the lower
court. Id. at 310.
34. Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731, 733 (7th Cir, 1971).
35. Id. at 732.
36, Id.
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1970, the district court granted HUD's motion to dismiss the com-
plaint for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. The dismissal was grounded on the
belief of the district court that HUD should not be held liable for
the discriminatory conduct of CHA.37  However, on appeal, the
Seventh Circuit reversed the lower court decision and ordered the
district court to enter a summary judgment for the plaintiffs, on
the grounds that HUD had violated both the due process clause
of the fifth amendment and 42 U.S.C. section 2000d by knowingly
assisting CHA's maintenance of a racially discriminatory public
housing program.38
37. Id. at 733. The complaint against HUD contained four separate
counts. Count I was brought under the general federal question stat-
ute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970), and the fifth amendment. It alleged that
HUD had violated the due process clause of the fifth amendment
through its actions of approving and funding CHA's racially discrim-
inatory programs. The district court concluded that "the Fifth Amend-
ment under the circumstances here alleged [did] not authorize this
suit," thus there was no jurisdiction to bring Count I. Id. Count II
alleged that HUD's acts had violated 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970), in that
the official conduct supported a racially discriminatory program. 42
U.S.C. § 2000d (1970) provides: "No person in the United States shall,
on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from par-
ticipation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimina-
tion under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assist-
ance." The district court dismissed Count II for a failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted. The district court felt that
the amount of financial assistance from HUD to CHA was insufficient
to make HUD a "joint participant" in CHA's racially discriminatory
conduct. The dismissal of Counts III and IV was not contested by
the plaintiffs. 448 F.2d at 733.
38. 448 F.2d at 740. The district court found that HUD had knowingly
approved and funded sites which were not "optimal," but only after
having made "'numerous and consistent efforts * * * to persuade the
Chicago Housing Authority to locate low-rent housing projects in
white neighborhoods.'" Id. at 737. HUD rationalized this procedure
on the theory "that it was better to fund a segregated housing system
than to deny housing altogether to the thousands of needy Negro fam-
ilies of that city." Id. The realities of community and city council
resistance were also offered as justifications. The court of appeals rec-
ognized the fact that HUD faced a major "dilemma" in trying to recon-
cile the conflicting interests. If HUD had applied an inordinate
amount of pressure on CHA, it would have been met with community
resistance, which would have effectively cut off federal funds and the
flow of new housing. However, the court of appeals refused to accept
"good faith" as a viable defense to a segregated result. The court of
appeals stated:
Courts have held that alleged good faith is no more of a de-
fense to segregation in public housing than it is to segregation
in public schools .... Moreover, the fact that it is a federal
agency or officer charged with an act of racial discrimination
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The next step to be taken in the litigation was the formula-
tion of relief with respect to the action against HUD.39 On re-
does not alter the pertinent standards since ". . . it would be
unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser
duty on the Federal Government."
Id. at 738 (citations omitted).
The court of appeals also found that HUD retains a large amount
of discretion over which projects are eligible for federal funding. HUD
has the power to approve or reject both site selection and tenant as-
signment procedures of local housing authorities, as a prerequisite to
funding. See note 119 infra. Based on the inapplicability of the "good
faith" argument and the failure of HUD to exercise its discretion in
a constitutionally sound manner, the court of appeals concluded that
HUD's past actions constituted racially discriminatory conduct in its
own right. Id. at 739.
39. However, before the issue of relief could be addressed, the lower
courts were faced with additional problems. Although CHA had been
ordered in 1969 to use its "best efforts" to increase the number of pub-
lic housing units, within a period of ten months from the order there
had not been any proposed sites submitted to the Chicago city council.
Under Illinois law a housing authority is required to obtain the ap-
proval of the local governmental entity before it can acquire any prop-
erty for development. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 67 , § 9 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1976). In the spring of 1971, CHA finally did submit a few pro-
posed sites, but the city council refused to pass approval of the sites.
Subsequently, on the basis of the inactivity and flouting of court or-
ders, the district court in Gautreaux v. Romney, 332 F. Supp. 366 (N.D.
fll. 1971), attempted to insure that the remedial orders entered against
CHA in 1969 would be implemented. The district court initiated a
"letter-of-intent" between the City of Chicago and HUD. The letter
provided that the city would approve sites for use by CHA and permit
the acquisition of the sites in accordance with a specified timetable.
On the basis of this "letter-of-intent" HUD would then release funds,
which had been held back due to inactivity on the public housing issue
for the city's "Model Cities Program." Once again the city fell behind
schedule and the district court was forced to enter an injunction, di-
recting HUD to withhold the "Model City Program" funds until the
city complied with the timetable by approving 700 dwelling units. Id.
at 368-70.
However, on appeal the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
in Gautreaux v. Romney, 457 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1972), reversed the
injunction, holding that the district court had abused its discretion in
granting the injunction, because there was not an explicit finding that
the Chicago "Model Cities Program" itself had been improperly ad-
ministered. The court of appeals felt that the denial of the funds was
an inappropriate way to force compliance with the original court or-
ders.
Subsequently, between July 1971 and April 1972, the city council
neglected to conduct any hearings with respect to site approval and
acquisition of developmental property. After the filing of a supple-
mental complaint by the plaintiffs, the district court, in Gautreaux v.
Chicago Hous. Auth., 342 F. Supp. 827 (N.D. ill. 1972), found that the
city's inaction had prevented CHA from complying with the earlier
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mand,40 the district court, upon the plaintiffs' motion, consolidated
the CHA and HUD remedial actions.4 1 The district court ordered
the parties to propose a "comprehensive plan to remedy the past ef-
fects of unconstitutional site selection procedures, '42 and to provide
the district court with feasible "alternatives which are not confined
in their scope to the geographic boundary of the City of Chicago.
4 3
After consideration of the plans submitted, the district court in a
memorandum opinion and judgment order, filed on September 11,
1973, denied the plaintiffs' motion for the implementation of a
metropolitan area plan. The metropolitan area remedial plan ad-
vocated by the plaintiffs included both Chicago and the surrounding
suburban areas. The plan the district court adopted required HUD
to use its "best efforts" to assist CHA in increasing the supply of
public housing units in compliance with existing HUD regulations,
applicable federal statutes and the judgment order entered against
CHA in 1969. 44 The district court specifically denied any form of
intermunicipal relief encompassing the whole metropolitan area,
for the following reasons: (1) the wrongs were committed within
the territorial limits of Chicago; (2) the complaint did not allege
racial discrimination in the contiguous suburbs; and (3) the subur-
ban political entities were not at any time parties to the lawsuit.4 5
On appeal however, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district
court's decision and remanded the case. The court of appeals held
that any plan designed to remedy the racially discriminatory public
housing system within Chicago would have to be organized on a
metropolitan area basis to be effective.46  The Seventh Circuit's
court order. The district court then circumvented the Illinois law re-
quirement of city council approval by suspending the approval re-
quirement as to CHA. In Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 480 F.2d
210 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1144 (1974), the court of
appeals affirmed the decision of the district court on the basis of the
broad equity powers available to a district court.
40. Gautreaux v. Romney, 363 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
41. 425 U.S. at 290.
42. Id.
43. 503 F.2d at 932. The district court order was not reported.
44. 363 F. Supp. at 691.
45. Id. at 690-91. The plaintiffs contended at the district court level, that
a metropolitan area remedial plan was absolutely necessary to fully
remedy the past effects of the unconstitutional segregationist policies,
and to achieve the racial balance required by the fourteenth amend-
ment. 503 F.2d at 932.
46. 503 F.2d at 936.
[T]he adoption of a comprehensive metropolitan area plan
that will not only disestablish the segregated public housing
system in the City of Chicago which has resulted from CHA's
and HUD's unconstitutional site selection and tenant assign-
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decision was based on an interpretation of a recent Supreme Court
opinion on school desegregation-Milliken v. Bradley.47 Milliken
was viewed as an extension of an established line of precedent de-
veloping the scope of federal courts' equity powers. 48 The Milliken
opinion explicitly required that prior to the imposition of an inter-
district remedy for school segregation, there must be a finding of
either an interdistrict constitutional violation or racially discrim-
inatory acts in one school district which had been the substantial
cause of the interdistrict segregation.49 Without the showing of
either an interdistrict violation or interdistrict effect there would
be no basis for the imposition of an interdistrict remedy.50 In
phrasing the basic question raised by Gautreaux, the Seventh Cir-
cuit adopted the language of Milliken: "The basic issue now before
the Court concerns . . . the appropriate exercise of federal equity
jurisdiction."'51 The precise equitable question raised by Gautreaux
was to how great a degree public housing desegregation is actually
practical and realizable. 52  The Seventh Circuit concluded that
Milliken did not bar a remedy of metropolitan area relief, in view
of the equitable and administrative distinctions between a metro-
politan public housing plan and the consolidation of school districts.
However, the court's language left unclear whether the opinion
was actually based on a satisfaction of the Milliken requirements
or on the equitable and administrative distinctions between public
housing and public schools.
The Seventh Circuit's conclusion that a metropolitan area rem-
edy was necessary was predicated on two main factors. First, the
ment procedures but will increase the supply of dwelling
units as rapidly as possible.
Id. at 939.
47. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
48. 503 F.2d at 935. Milliken was seen by the court as a logical extension
of recognized equitable principles. The court stated:
Beginning in Brown I, the court recognized that remedial
complexities may limit or delay implementation of the consti-
tutional right to school desegregation .... In Brown II, the
court emphasized local school problems ... and Justice Stew-
art in Milliken, reminded that "[T]raditionally, equity has
been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its
remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling public
and private needs."
Id. at 935. The court also quoted the following rule for reconciling
practical equity problems: "Having once found a violation, the dis-
trict judge or school authorities should make every effort to achieve
the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation, taking into ac-
count the practicalities of the situation." Id. at 935.
49. Id.
50. 418 U.S. at 745.
51. 503 F.2d at 935.
52. Id. at 936.
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court determined that the equitable factors which prevented inter-
district relief in Milliken were not present in a public housing con-
text. The court said that the deeply-rooted tradition of local con-
trol over the operation of public schools was not present in public
housing. Rather, public housing had its roots in federal statutes
where federal involvement was pervasive.53 Second, the court said
that the administrative problems involved in the location of low-
income public housing were not comparable to the problems raised
by the restructuring of a large number of school districts as pro-
posed in Milliken.54 The opinion indicated that the Seventh Circuit
probably based its holding on these two factors. However, some
language in the opinion implied that the Milliken standard was
satisfied. Although the Seventh Circuit in Gautreaux could not
point to any specific examples, it said that there was some evidence
that the constitutional violations in Chicago had discriminatory
effects throughout the metropolitan area. 5 It also noted that the
evidence offered, including the testimony of expert witnesses, estab-
lished that the whole metropolitan area was a single relevant lo-
cality for public housing purposes and that a "city only" directive
would not fully remedy the effect of the unconstitutional conduct.56
53. Id. The equitable and administrative factors present in Milliken were
that consolidation of the 54 independent school districts would have
presented staggering problems of logistics, finance, administration, and
political legitimacy; and the presence of a "deeply rooted" and "essen-
tial" tradition of local control of public schools; and the fact that a
district judge could possibly become both a de facto legislature and
a metropolitan school superintendent. Id. at 935.
54. Id. at 936.
55. Id. at 936-37. The Seventh Circuit cited two examples of suburban
discrimination. First, the court concluded that the evidence indicated
that of the 12 suburban public housing projects, 10 were located in
or adjacent to overwhelmingly black census tracts. Second, the Sev-
enth Circuit pointed to the case of Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc.,
501 F.2d 324, 335 (7th Cir. 1974), wherein the court had taken judicial
notice of widespread residential segregation in Chicago and the sur-
rounding area. The widespread segregation in Clark led the court to
conclude that there had been a prima facie showing that the segrega-
tion had discriminatory effects throughout the metropolitan area. 503
F.2d at 937.
The court's reliance on Clark could be misplaced. In Clark the
court took judicial notice of widespread residential segregation, while
in Gautreaux the court of appeals was concerned with public housing
segregation furthered by governmental conduct. Logically, it could
be possible that there could be both widespread residential segregation
in a metropolitan area as in Clark and a city housing authority that
was validly operating so as not to violate the Constitution.
56. Emphasizing that fLJD believed the metropolitan area should be
viewed as a single locality for public housing purposes, the Seventh
Circuit quoted a statement by Secretary Romney:
The impact of the concentration of the poor and minorities
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The combination of these factors confirmed that the only solution
was the imposition of a public housing plan which would include
the political subdivisions surrounding Chicago.5
7
The Seventh Circuit's opinion reaffirmed the philosophy of the
majority of federal courts that adheres to a dispersal theory of
housing as the proper method for correcting segregationist con-
duct.58 The need to distribute low-income public housing through-
in the central city extends beyond the city boundaries to in-
clude the surrounding community. The City and the suburbs
together make up what I call the 'real city'. To solve prob-
lems of the 'real city' only metropolitan-wide solutions will
do.
503 F.2d at 937 (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 939. In dissent, Judge Tone emphasized that Milliken requires
an interdistrict violation. He believed that no such violations were
offered or proved. He stated that the
principle is that the remedy must be commensurate with the
constitutional violation found, and, therefore, an inter-district
remedy is not justified unless the evidence shows an inter-
district violation.... This seems to me to preclude metro-
politan relief here. No violation outside the city has ever
been alleged, let alone proved as the District Court pointed
out.
Id.
58. In finding HUD's conduct to be violative of the Constitution, the Sev-
enth Circuit joined the majority of federal courts in their concern for
rectifying racial problems. These courts share the underlying belief
that racial and ghetto problems cannot be resolved as long as minority
groups are segregated within the inner city.
In Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619 (D. La. 1969), the court held
HUD liable on facts nearly identical to those in Gautreaux. The court
stated:
HUD was not only aware of the situation in Bogulusa [Louisi-
ana] but it effectively directed and controlled each and every
step in the program .... HUD thus sanctioned the violation
of plaintiff's rights ... since it could have halted the discrimi-
nation at any step in the program. Consequently, its own dis-
criminatory conduct in this respect is violative of 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d.
Id. at 623.
In Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970), the plaintiffs
sought to enjoin HUD from paying rent supplements on a multi-family
project. The complaint was based on the theory that a location of the
site would have the effect of increasing an already high concentration
of low income blacks. The court of appeals held that HUD failed
properly to take into account the factor of racial concentration in
approving the project. The Seventh Circuit recognized that HUD was
vested with broad supervisory discretion but stated that the "discretion
must be exercised within the framework of the national policy against
discrimination in federally assisted housing ... and in favor of fair
housing." Id. at 819. The Seventh Circuit also reasoned that:
Possibly before 1964 the administrators of the federal housing
programs could ... remain blind to the very real effect that
racial concentration has had in the development of urban
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out the metropolitan area was a primary concern of the Seventh
Circuit. It stated: "We must not sentence our poor, our under-
privileged, our minorities to the jobless slums of the ghettos and
blight. Today such color blindness is impermissible. In-
crease or maintenance of racial concentration is prima facie
likely to lead to urban blight and is thus prima facie at vari-
ance with the national housing policy.
Id. at 820-21 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
In Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd, 457 F.2d
788 (5th Cir. 1972), the district court stated:
For better or worse, both by legislative act and judicial deci-
sion, this nation is committed to a policy of balanced and dis-
persed public housing.. this reflects the recognition that in
the area of public housing local authorities can no more con-
fine low income blacks to a compacted and concentrated area
than they can confine their children to segregated schools.
Id. at 390 (emphasis added).
In Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175 (N.D. Ohio 1972), the district
court enjoined the development of future public housing in black areas
on the basis of the need for racial dispersal. The court stated that
"the failure of the housing authority to include any racial criteria in
determining site selection constitutes a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id. at 1182. The court indicated that in low income
housing cases the discriminatory actions may be judged by their effect
and not necessarily an actual intent to discriminate. In discussing the
possible ways to accomplish dispersal of public housing, the court
stated:
Dispersal of public housing can mean many things to many
people. To some it could mean the equal dispersal of eachtype of housing, beginning with the present type of housing,
scattered site family housing. To others, including this court,dispersal of public housing means that if historically housing
has been built primarily in one area or section of the city,ousing must be built in other areas  ti s of the city
until such time as all the public housing in the city is dis-
persed. By this method, given an energetic housing authority,a cooperative city and cooperation from the federal housing
agencies, it is possible that dispersal of housing could be
accomplished within a reasonable time. Under the firstmethod discussed, dispersal of public housing would most
likely never be achieved and we will have left the next gen-
eration only a potential lawsuit, rather than an integratedcommunity.
Id. at 1184 (emphasis added).
See also Croskey St. Concerned Citizens v. Romney, 459 F.2d 109
(3d Cir. 1972) (upholding the refusal of the district court to enjoin
construction of low-income housing project based on HUD's formula
for balanced racial distribution); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City
of Lackawanna, 318 F. Supp. 669 (W.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 436 F.2d 108 (2dCir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971) (a city could not, absent
a compeling interest, wtha e efforts of a private organization to
building housing for low-income families in white areas of the city,
by refusing a reasonable zoning request); Dailey v. City of Lawton,
296 F. Supp. 266 (W.D. Okla. 1969), aff'd, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir.
1970) (a refusal to grant rezoning essential to erection of low-rent
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thereby forever trap them in the vicious cycle of poverty which
can only lead them to lives of crime and violence."59
On rehearing, the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed the necessity for
consideration of metropolitan area relief.60 However, instead of
explicitly following its prior equitable and administrative distinc-
tion rationale, the court indicated that the Milliken standard was
satisfied by the statistical evidence presented.,1 In particular, it
said that the impact of the city discrimination appeared to affect
housing patterns significantly throughout the metropolitan area.6
2
HUD sought review of this decision by the Supreme Court on the
issue of the permissibility of a metropolitan area remedial plan in
the absence of a specific finding of an intermunicipal violation.
63
III. THE COURT'S DECISION
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Seventh Circuit
and remanded the case to the district court, holding that a metro-
politan area remedy is not impermissible as a matter of law.6 4 The
housing project was motivated by desire to keep large concentration
of blacks and other minority groups from living in the area).
59. 503 F.2d at 938.
60. Id. at 939.
61. Id. at 940. It is difficult clearly to ascertain the actual standard ap-
plied by the court. The order on rehearing seems to imply that a Mil-
liken standard was applied. However, the original holding was based
on the theory that the standard for public schools was not required,
since Milliken was based on equitable and administrative problems
not associated with public housing. A logical conclusion would be
that the Seventh Circuit actually applied the Milliken standard since
it did not reaffirm its earlier language; however, it could be implied
that under either test metropolitan area relief was warranted.
62. Id. at 940.
63. Assuming the Seventh Circuit applied the Miliken standard, there is
a question as to whether the requisite elements for interdistrict relief
actually were present. The main objection, as the dissent emphasized,
is that there was an absence of explicit proof that the constitutional
violation within the City of Chicago produced a significant segregative
effect in the metropolitan area or was the substantial cause of inter-
municipality segregation as required by Miliken. The Seventh Circuit
also relied on the factors of "racial paranoia" and "white flight" which
were largely unsubstantiated and speculative. Another objection is
the fact that the suburban political subdivisions were included within
the desegregation plan although they were not parties to the litigation.
They had no opportunity to answer accusations or present evidence.
64. 425 U.S. at 300. The case was remanded to the district court "for addi-
tional evidence and further consideration of the issue of metropolitan
area relief." Id. at 306. The court explicitly stated that this order
should not be interpreted as requiring a metropolitan order. The dis-
trict court was merely granted the authority to order such relief in
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opinion was based on two major considerations. First, the Court
held that the entering of a remedial order against HUD, which
would affect its operation outside Chicago's geographic boundaries,
but within the metropolitan housing market, was warranted because
HUD had violated the Constitution and several federal statutes.6 5
In distinguishing the school desegregation cases from situations in-
volving discrimination in public housing, the Court interpreted
Milliken as not imposing a per se rule that federal courts lacked
the authority to order remedial action beyond the municipal bound-
aries where the constitutional violation occurred. 6
Second, the Court determined that an order affecting HUD's
conduct outside Chicago's boundaries would not interfere imper-
missibly with the operation of local governments and suburban
housing authorities not actually implicated as participants in HUD's
unconstitutional conduct.6 7 This conclusion was supported by the
fact that under 42 U.S.C. section 1437f HUD has the authority to
contract directly with private owners and developers for the loca-
tion of public housing.
6 8
A. Milliken v. Bradley
The most important issue facing the Supreme Court in Gautreaux
was the proper application of Milliken v. Bradley69 to the context
of intermunicipality housing segregation.70 In Milliken the Court
the exercise of its equitable discretion after a careful consideration of
the plans offered.
65. Id. at 297-300.
66. Id. at 293. The court stated:
Although the Milliken opinion discussed the many practical
problems that would be encountered in the consolidation of
numerous school districts by judicial decree, the Court's deci-
sion rejecting the metropolitan area desegregation order was
actually based on fundamental limitations on the remedial
powers of the federal court to restructure the operation of lo-
cal and state governmental entities. That power is not plen-
ary. It "may be exercised 'only on the basis of a constitu-
tional violation.'"
Id. (citations omitted).
67. Id. at 300-05.
68. Id.
69. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
70. In April of 1970 the Detroit Board of Education altered its high school
attendance zones to create a better black-white student distribution.
Later, in response to white parental opposition, the Michigan Legisla-
ture passed an act which delayed the implementation of the Detroit
school board's integration plan. Due to individual board member
changes the zoning plan ultimately was rescinded. In August of 1970
a class action was instituted on behalf of all the school children and
their parents in Detroit. The complaint alleged that the class was be-
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was faced with the continuing problem of defining the proper scope
of a federal court's equitable powers to order remedial relief in a
school desegregation case.71 The basic issue in Milliken was wheth-
ing denied the equal protection of the laws due to the unconstitutional
segregation pattern that had developed in the Detroit school system
as a result of the policies of the Detroit Board of Education and the
State of Michigan. The plaintiffs asked for a preliminary injunction
against the enforcement of the Michigan Act restraining implementa-
tion of the school zoning changes. Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215,
219-20 (6th Cir. 1973).
The facts and conclusion accepted by the Supreme Court were; to-
wit: (1) that the Detroit Board of Education had maintained attend-
ance zones designed to perpetuate racial segregation, Bradley v. Milli-
ken, 338 F. Supp. 582, 588 (1971); (2) that the Board had transferred
black students from overcrowded black schools to other black ma-
jority schools, instead of sending them to an uncrowded white ma-
jority school, 484 F.2d at 221; (3) that the Board maintained an op-
tional attendance zone which resulted in white students being allowed
to transfer to all white schools, 338 F. Supp. at 587; and (4) that these
policies effectively created one-race schools in the Detroit school sys-
tem constituting de jure segregation. Id. at 588-89.
71. See Note, Intent to Segregate: The Omaha Presumption, 44 Geo.
WASH. L.R. 775 (1976). Milliken is one of the latest decisions in a
long line of cases developing the guidelines for the formulation of
proper equitable remedies. In Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954) [hereinafter referred to as Brown I], the Court overruled all
of its earlier decisions under the doctrine of "separate but equal" fa-
cilities as expressed in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). The
Court held that race was not a rational basis for classification as to
use of facilities and thus state imposed segregation of public school
violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
Court stated that "in the field of public education, the doctrine of 'sep-
arate but equal' has no place," and that separate educational facilities
are inherently unequal. 347 U.S. at 495.
Subsequently, Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) [here-
inafter referred to as Brown Ill, which dealt with the proper form of
relief afforded by Brown I, the Court indicated that federal courts
should be guided by equitable principles in formulating effective re-
medial decrees. Brown II imposed a good faith requirement on state
and school officials to comply with the mandates of Brown I. The
lower federal courts were granted a great deal of flexibility in the
shaping of remedies, including the authority to revise school districts.
349 U.S. at 300. The Court stated:
Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical
flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjust-
ing and reconciling public and private needs .... [C] ourts
may consider problems related to administration ... revision
of school districts and attendance areas into compact units to
achieve a system of determining admission to the public
schools on a nonracial basis, and revision of local laws and
regulations which may be necessary in solving the foregoing
problems.
Id. at 300-01.
In Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971),
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er a federal court could impose a multidistrict remedy where evi-
dence of segregating conduct was found in one school district, but
not in the other school districts. 7 2 The district court found that the
Detroit school board and state officials had contributed to racial
segregation in the Detroit schools, in the form of de jure discrim-
ination.7 3 The district court established a desegregation panel to
prepare a remedial plan which would consolidate the Detroit school
system and 53 independent suburban school districts.7 4 The Sixth
Circuit affirmed the desegregation order, concluding that "the only
feasible desegregation plan involves the crossing of the boundary
lines between the Detroit School District and adjacent or nearby
school districts for the limited purpose of providing an effective
desegregation plan. '7 5 However, the Supreme Court reversed, stat-
the Court dealt with "the problem of defining in more precise terms
than heretofore the scope of the duty of school authorities and district
courts in implementing Brown I and the mandate to eliminate dual
systems and establish unitary systems at once." Id. at 6.
The court in Swann specifically granted federal district courts
broad powers in dealing with de jure segregation. The court cited
the imposition of racial quotas and the power to alter attendance zones
as examples of remedies. Id. at 22-29. The Swanm opinion held that
the task before the federal courts was to correct the condition that of-
fends the Constitution by balancing the individual and collective in-
terests affected. The Court stated that a federal remedial power can
only be exercised "on the basis of a constitutional violation" and,
"[a]s with any equity case, the nature of the violation determines the
scope of the remedy." Id. at 16.
There were a number of cases prior to Milliken which considered
the fragility of school district lines. See Wright v. Council of the City
of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972); United States v. Scotland Neck Bd.
of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972) (school district lines and state laws were
not unpenetrable, and if they conflicted with the fourteenth amend-
ment the federal court had a duty to enter the appropriate remedy;
the court held that state or local officials were prevented from carving
out a new school district from an existing district in the process of
dismantling a dual school system).
72. 418 U.S. at 744.
73. See Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
The Board's practice of shaping school attendance zones ...
with the result that zone boundaries conformed to racial-resi-
dential dividing lines, violated the Fourteenth Amendment
.... The manner in which the board formulated attendance
zones for elementary schools had the natural and predictable
effect of perpetuating racial segregation of students. Such
conduct is an act of de jure discrimination in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 592-93.
74. Bradley v. Milliken, 345 F. Supp. 914, 917 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
75. Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 249 (6th Cir. 1973). The Sixth Cir-
cuit stated that the acts of racial discrimination shown in the record
were related to the segregation found in the entire metropolitan public
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ing that there were "no constitutional violations that would call for
equitable relief except within the city of Detroit."76  The Court
held that the multidistrict remedy was based on an erroneous
standard and involved an improper exercise of the equitable au-
thority of the federal courts.7 7
school system. A metropolitan area remedial plan was thought appro-
priate because the State had participated in the violations. The Sixth
Circuit concluded that the plan could be implemented on the State's
authority to control local school districts. The court stated that "the
State has committed de jure acts of segregation and ... the State con-
trols the instrumentalities whose action is necessary to remedy the
harmful effects of the State acts." Id. at 249.
Judge Weich, dissenting, pointed out the problems associated with
the Sixth Circuit opinion. He emphasized that the remedial order was
issued in the absence of necessary parties, which resulted in prejudice
to the school districts because they had no effective participation. To
support his conclusion he cited Bradley v. School Bd. of the City of
Richmond, 338 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va. 1972), where the district judge
had required the adjoining suburban counties to be joined as defend-
ants so as to give them an opportunity to be heard on the merits. 484
F.2d at 266.
76. 418 U.S. at 752. The court also stated:
[I]t must be shown that racially discriminatory acts of the
state or local school districts, or of a single school district have
been a substantial cause of interdistrict segregation. Thus an
interdistrict remedy might be in order where the racially dis-
criminatory acts of one or more school districts caused racial
segregation in an adjacent district, or where district lines have
been deliberately drawn on the basis of race .... Con-
versely, without an interdistrict violation and interdistrict ef-
fect, there is no constitutional wrong calling for an interdis-
trict remedy.
Id. at 745.
77. Id. at 752-53. Justice Stewart's concurrence in Milliken foreshadowed
the situation and holding in Gautreaux. He stated:
[T]his is not to say however, that an interdistrict remedy of
the sort approved by the Court of Appeals would not be
proper, or even necessary, in other factual situations. Were
it to be shown, for example, that state officials had con-
tributed to the separation of the races by drawing or redraw-
ing school district lines,... or by purposefully, racially dis-
criminatory use of state housing or zoning laws, then a decree
calling for transfer of pupils across district lines or for restruc-
turing of district lines might well be appropriate.
Id. at 755.
The majority of the Court in Milliken rejected the argument offered
by the dissent that since the agencies involved in maintaining the dual
school system in Detroit possessed statewide authority then the district
court should have a relatively free hand in restructuring the school
districts outside of Detroit. Id. at 745-46. The majority adhered to
the view that the disparate treatment of black students occurred only
in Detroit thus limiting any remedy to that system.
Justices Douglas, Brennan, Marshall and White dissented from the
majority opinion in Milliken. Justice Marshall in a strong dissent
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The Supreme Court in Gautreaux viewed Milliken as establish-
ing a basic limitation on the exercise of federal courts' equitable
powers.7 8  The Court stated that Milliken limited the "remedial
powers of the federal courts to restructure the operation of local
and state governmental entities," 79 to situations where there had
been a constitutional violation.8 0 Once such a constitutional viola-
tion was found, it would be the duty of the federal courts to make
"'the scope of the remedy' . . . fit 'the nature and extent of the
constitutional violation.' "83- The Court held that the interdistrict
decree in Milliken was impermissible because it was not commen-
surate with the constitutional violation to be remedied. Such a
decree would have had the effect of direct federal judicial inter-
ference with the operation of local governments without first find-
ing a constitutional violation by those entities or a significant segre-
gative effect from the conduct of the Detroit school district.8 2 The
Court concluded that the interdistrict desegregation order in Mil-
liken "contemplated a judicial decree restructuring the operation
of local governmental entities that were not implicated in any con-
stitutional violation."' 3
Unlike the Seventh Circuit, the Court did not view its opinion
affirming the permissibility of a metropolitan area remedy as
resting on the equitable and administrative distinctions between
the location of public housing and the desegregation of school
districts.8 4 The Court said that Milliken was not based on a balanc-
stated that where "state-imposed segregation has been demonstrated,
it becomes the duty of the State to eliminate root and branch all ves-
tiges of racial discrimination and to achieve the greatest possible de-
gree of actual desegregation." Id. at 782. Justice Marshall empha-
sized what he believed to be a serious analytical flaw in the majority
opinion's concluding sentence, in which the case was remanded for
"prompt formulation of a decree directed to eliminating the segrega-
tion found to exist in Detroit city schools, a remedy which has been
delayed since 1970." Id. at 753. Justice Marshall believed that be-
cause of the rapidly increasing number of black students in the Detroit
system, a Detroit-only plan could not achieve actual desegregation
thus violating the principle of Brown I. Id. at 799. He stated that
"the majority, however, seems to have forgotten the district court's
explicit finding that a Detroit only decree, the only remedy permitted
under today's decision, 'would not accomplish desegregation.'" Id. at
783.
78. 425 U.S. at 294.
79. Id. at 293.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 293-94 (citations omitted).
82. Id. at 294.
83. Id. at 296.
84. Id. at 294. See note 52 supra. The Court criticized the unsupported
conclusions drawn by the court of appeals. Id. at 295 n.ll. The Sev-
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ing of the competing consideration in a school desegregation case,
but instead was premised on the equity power of the federal courts.8 5
Nevertheless, the distinctions between school district desegregation
and public housing desegregation are important to an understanding
of the limitations on the exercise of the federal courts' equitable
powers.8 6 The most important principle in Miliken that can be
used in a public housing context is that boundary lines cannot be
"'casually ignored or treated as a mere administrative convenience'
because they separate independent governmental entities respon-
sible for the operation of autonomous." 87 municipalities.
B. The Court's Reasoning
Consistent with its interpretation of Miliken, the Court char-
acterized the basic question in Gautreaux as concerning only the
authority of the district court to order HUD to take remedial action
outside the city limits of Chicago."8 On appeal, HUD did not dis-
enth Circuit interpreted the Milliken opinion as holding that the ad-
ministrative complexities involved with school district consolidation
and the deeply rooted tradition of local control of schools outweighed
the potential of a metropolitan area school desegregation remedy.
However, the Supreme Court stated that Milliken was premised on
the permissible scope of the federal judicial power.
The Seventh Circuit also concluded that there was either an inter-
district violation or interdistrict effect present in Gautreaux. The Su-
preme Court, however, stated that there was no evidence in the record
which would support either theory. The Seventh Circuit relied on Ex-
hibit 11 as the sole basis of the alleged suburban discrimination. It
established that of the 12 public housing projects located outside of
the Chicago city limits 11 were located in areas with less than 70%
white population. However, the Supreme Court pointed out that this
exhibit was not offered as evidence that the suburban municipalities
were guilty of discrimination but to show the scarcity of public hous-
ing opportunities open to minorities. Thus the Seventh Circuit was
mistaken in relying on the exhibit as evidence of suburban discrimina-
tion. The Supreme Court noted that there was no evidence offered
that established a constitutional violation in the city which had a sig-
nificant segregative effect in the suburban municipalities or that
proved the housing policies of the suburbs were the substantial cause
of the segregation. The Supreme Court also criticized the Seventh Cir-
cuit's assertion that it was reasonable to conclude from the record that
the violations committed in Chicago caused "racial paranoia" and en-
couraged "white flight." The Court stated that, "such unsupported
speculation' falls far short of the demonstration of a 'significant segre-
gative effect in another district' as required by Milliken." Id. at 295
n.11.
85. Id. at 294.
86. Id. at 295.
87. Id. at 295-96 (citations omitted).
88. Id. at 296.
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pute the lower court's findings that it had violated the fifth amend-
ment and the Civil Rights Act of 196489 by knowingly funding
CHA's racially discriminatory housing programs.9 0 HUD's basic
argument was that an order requiring it to take remedial action
outside of the boundaries of Chicago was barred by Milliken. 1
This argument was premised on the following considerations. HUD
asserted that a remedial order granting metropolitan area relief
would constitute a grant of relief beyond the actual scope of the
constitutional violation, and that an order regulating its action out-
side of the Chicago boundaries would have the effect of "consol-
idat[ing] for remedial purposes" governmental units not originally
implicated in HUD's and CHA's violations.
92
The remaining question facing the Court in Gautreaux con-
cerned the scope of such a remedial order.9 8 Relying on recognized
equitable principles9 4 the Court indicated that a judicial order di-
recting HUD to construct public housing in the metropolitan area
would not have the effect of coercing uninvolved governmental
units. This conclusion was based on the fact that both CHA and
HUD adready had the authority to operate outside the Chicago city
limits.9 5 Thus, in reality, Gautreaux merely directed HUD and
CHA to do what they could have done on a voluntary basis. A
metropolitan remedial order directed against HUD would not have
the effect of requiring the suburban municipalities to change their
activities. The order would affect only HUD's operations. How-
ever, in Milliken, an interdistrict remedy would have consolidated
a large number of suburban school districts without finding a con-
stitutional violation on their part.
The Court specifically rejected HUD's contention that Milliken
precluded an order affecting its action throughout the entire metro-
politan area.9 6 The Court said Milliken placed no specific limits on
the authority of federal courts to order relief outside the municipal
boundaries of a city where the prerequisite constitutional violation
89. See note 16 supra.
90. 425. U.S. at 296.
91. Id. at 296-97.
92. Id. at 297.
93. Id.
94. See note 70 supra.
95. 425 U.S. at 298.
96. Id. Although the State of Michigan was found to have contributed
to the maintenance of racial segregation in Detroit, the Court in Milli-
ken limited the remedy to the Detroit system because previous cases
"each addressed the issue of constitutional wrong in terms of an estab-
lished geographic and administrative school system," and because of
the local and statutory tradition of local school district control. 418
U.S. at 742-44, 746.
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has been found.9 7 The critical distinction between HUD and the
suburban school districts involved in Milliken was the fact that
HUD explicitly had been found by the lower courts to have violated
the Constitution. 8 This violation provided the necessary predicate
for the entering of a remedial order against HUD 9
The Court emphasized that an order directing HUD to create
low-income public housing alternatives in the Chicago suburbs was
"entirely appropriate and consistent with Millike"e'l00 on the theory
that HUD's constitutional violation subjected the plaintiffs to seg-
regated public housing.10 1 Consistent with the approach of the
Seventh Circuit,10 2 the Court took notice of the fact that the rele-
vant geographic area for imposition of an effective remedy was
the entire metropolitan housing market, not limited by the Chicago
city limits. 10 3 In fact, HUD, in the administration of federal hous-
ing assistance programs, recognized that the housing market area
"usually extends beyond the city limits" and "may extend into sev-
97. 425 U.S. at 298.
98. Id. at 297. The Court noted that its prior decisions mandated that in
the event of a constitutional violation "all reasonable methods must
be available to formulate an effective remedy." Id. See North Caro-
lina Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 46 (1970). The Court also
cited Davis v. School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 402 U.S. 33 (1970),
for the proposition that a federal court should employ those methods
that would "'achieve the greatest possible degree of [relief], taking
into account the practicalities of the situation.'" Id. at 37. The Court
quoting from Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Edue. 402 U.S. 1
(1970), stated that, "[o]nce a right and a violation have been shown,
the scope of a district court's equitable power to remedy past wrongs
is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable rem-
edies." Id. at 15.
99. 425 U.S. at 298. According to Illinois law a city housing authority
has the power to operate within an "area of operation". This area
includes the territorial boundary of the city and all of the area within
three miles of the city boundary that is not located within the bound-
aries of another city. A housing authority could also act outside this
area by contracting with another housing authority. See ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 67', §§ 17(b), 27c (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976). See note 121
infra, for discussion of HUD authority.
An important distinction between Milliken and Gautreaux is that
in Milliken the state had the authority to operate across school district
lines, but the exercise of that authority would have had the effect of
eliminating or restructuring a number of independent school districts.
However, in Gautreaux, an order granting metropolitan relief would
not displace the rights and powers of the suburban governmental en-
tities under either federal or state law.
100. 425 U.S. at 299.
101. Id.
102. See note 56 supra.
103. 425 U.S. at 299.
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eral adjoining counties," depending on the size of the metropolitan
area. 0 4  Applying this factor, the Court declared that for a reme-
dial decree to be consistent with the "nature and extent of the con-
stitutional violations," it logically must include the whole of the
metropolitan area.' 0 5 The Court stated that to foreclose metro-
politan area relief solely because HUD's unconstitutional conduct
occurred within the city limits of Chicago "would transform Milli-
ken's principled limitation on the exercise of federal judiciary au-
thority into an arbitrary and mechanical shield for those found
to have engaged in unconstitutional conduct."'106 In Milliken, the
Court implied that political or administrative boundaries drawn by
states would not be allowed to be breached when dealing with the
central city in large metropolitan areas. However, in Gautreaux
the Court dispelled any notion that governmental subdivisions can
avoid metropolitan area remedies by the existence or erection of
administrative boundaries in cases involving a constitutional viola-
tion.
The second question discussed by the Court was whether under
Milliken an order against HUD directing remedial action outside
Chicago boundaries would interfere impermissibly with the oper-
ation of local governments and suburban housing authorities that
were not implicated as participants in HUD's constitutional viola-
tions.10 7  HUD contended that a remand for consideration of a
metropolitan area decree was impermissible because "'court-
ordered metropolitan relief in this case, no matter how gently it's
gone about, no matter how it's framed, is bound to require HUD
to ignore the safeguards of local autonomy and local political proc-
esses' "108 thus violating the limitations on federal judicial power
established in Milliken. 09 The Court suggested that HUD's posi-
104. See Department of Housing and Urban Development, FHA Techniques
of Housing Market Analysis 12 (Jan. 1970). In large metropolitan
areas HUD gathers its statistics on the basis of the relevant metropoli-
tan housing market not limited by municipal boundaries.
105. 425 U.S. at 300.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. (citations omitted).
109. Id. at 300-01. In discussing this issue, the Court was not called upon
to evaluate the validity of any specific order because one had not yet
been formulated. The Seventh Circuit's decision did not endorse or
discuss any particular plans, but instead left the formulation of the
remedial plan to the district court on remand. 503 F.2d at 936. How-
ever, on rehearing the Seventh Circuit did state that the purpose of
the remand was to gather "additional evidence" and consider further
"the issue of metropolitan area relief in light of this opinion and that
of the Supreme Court in Milliken v. Bradley." Id. at 940.
DISCRIMINATION
tion underestimated the ability of federal courts to formulate a
decree that would grant the plaintiffs constitutional relief without
exceeding the limits of judicial power established in Milliken.110
The Court's conclusion was that a metropolitan area remedial order
would not interfere with the operation of local governments and
suburban housing authorities."'. The Court said, that because MUD
had the authority to select housing projects for funding and con-
tract directly with private owners and developers for the con-
struction of low income housing, HUD could be required to take
remedial actions which would not preempt or interfere with the
operation of local governments. 1 2 The problems associated with
Milliken, namely the logistics of restructuring a large number of
school districts and the manageability of such a system, are not
present in a public housing context to interfere with the operation
of the local governments.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on two main factors.
First, an order directing HUD to use its discretion to encourage
the development of low income housing in suburban areas would
be entirely consistent with established federal housing policy.
113
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits racial discrim-
ination in federally assisted public housing programs.1 4 In 1967,
in response to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, HUD
issued site-approval regulations for low income housing. These
regulations were designed to avoid racial segregation and to give
low income minority groups a chance to find housing outside areas
of minority concentration." 5 In addition to adopting site-approval
regulations, HUD outlined a system of "Project Selection Criteria"
for the purpose of "eliminating clearly unacceptable proposals and
assigning priorities in funding to assure that the best proposals are
110. 425 U.s. at 301.
111. Id.
112. Id. See note 121 infra.
113. Id.
114. Id. HUD was held to have violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 by its funding of CHA's projects. 448 F.2d at 740.
115. See Department of Housing and Urban Development, Low Rent Hous-
ing Manual § 205.1, 4g (Feb. 1967 rev.). On the basis of these reg-
ulations HUD rejected any application which would significantly con-
tribute to racial concentrations and perpetuate housing segregation.
This presumption against acceptability could be overcome by showing
that there were an equivalent number of low rent housing units out-
side the area of racial concentration within the housing authority's ju-
risdiction. In addition, Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 re-
quires HUD to "administer the programs and activities relating to
housing and urban development in a manner affirmatively to further"
the Act's fair housing policy. 42 U.S.C. § 3608 (d) (5) (1970).
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funded first."116 The most important of these criteria considered
by HUD in evaluating applications for public housing is the one
dealing with "Minority Housing Opportunities. 11 7 This criterion
"is designed to assure that building in minority areas goes forward
only after there truly exist housing opportunities for minorities
elsewhere" and "that the housing available to minorities outside
areas of minority concentrations is more than a token amount of
so few units that there is in fact no true opportunity."' s
116. See HUD Evaluation of Rent Supplement Projects and Low-Rent
Housing Assistance Applications, 37 Fed. Reg. 203 (1972).
117. The "Project Selection Criteria" rules govern the evaluation of appli-
cations for funding of housing projects under Housing Act of 1937, 42
U.S.C. § 1437f (Supp. IV 1974), as amended by Housing Authorization
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-375, § 2, 90 Stat. 1068 (1976). There are
eight criteria that are considered in multi-family applications. They
are: (1) need for low-income housing; (2) minority housing opportu-
nities; (3) improved location for low-income families; (4) relationship
to orderly growth and development; (5) relationship of proposed proj-
ect to physical environment; (6) ability to perform; (7) project poten-
tial for creating minority employment and business opportunities; and
(8) provision for sound housing management. Each proposal sub-
mitted for funding is rated superior, adequate, or poor on the basis
of the criteria. The objectives of the "Minority Housing Opportunity"
criterion are "[tfo provide minority families with opportunities for
housing in a wide range of locations [and] [t]o open up nonsegregated
housing opportunities that will contribute to decreasing the effects of
past housing discriminations." 37 Fed. Reg. 203, 206 (1972).
118. 37 Fed. Reg. 203, 204 (1972). Several fundamental suggestions of
guidelines for governing HUD's site approval decisions have been
listed:
1. HUD must have an institutionalized method to weigh socio-
economic factors in considering housing proposals.
2. HUD should include, among the various criteria by which
applications for housing assistance are judged, the extent to
which a proposed project or the overall development plan of
which it is a part, will in fact open up new, nonsegregated
housing opportunities that will contribute to decreasing the
effects of past housing discrimination. This means that HUD
should consider the impact of proposals on patterns of racial
concentration.
3. Involuntary racial concentration leads to urban blight; it
is therefore contrary to national housing policy for HUD to
reinforce racial concentration in making its housing site deci-
sions.
4. HUD may approve housing proposals in areas of racial con-
centration when its informed judgment is that the need for
physical rehabilitation or additional minority housing at the
site in question clearly outweighs the disadvantage of increas-
ing or perpetuating racial concentration.
5. HUD may not knowingly acquiesce in a racially discrimina-
tory housing program or proposal.
6. Community opposition to sites outside areas of minority
concentration does not justify HUD's funding of a racially dis-
criminatory housing program or proposal.
Maxwell, supra note 9, at 100. See 24 C.F.R. § 200.710 (1976).
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Second, the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974119
increased the ability of HUD, independent of local governing bodies,
to create new housing programs. According to section 1437f,
120
HUD has the authority to contract directly with private owners to
make housing units available to eligible low-income persons.
121
119. Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 201, 88 Stat. 653 (1974) (codified in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.). Congress emphasized the importance of locat-
ing public housing so as to avoid concentrations of low-income persons
in the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974:
(c) The primary objective of this chapter is the develop-
ment of viable urban communities, by providing decent hous-
ing and a suitable living environment and expanding eco-
nomic opportunities, principally for persons of low and mod-
erate income. Consistent with this primary objective, the
Federal assistance provided in. this chapter is for the support
of community development activities which are directed to-
ward the following specific objectives-
(6) the reduction of the isolation of income groups within
communities and geographical areas and the promotion of an
increase in the diversity and vitality of neighborhoods through
the spatial deconcentration of housing opportunities for per-
sons of lower income and the revitalization of deteriorating
or deteriorated neighborhoods to attract persons of higher in-
come.
42 U.S.C. § 5301(c) (Supp. IV 1974).
120. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (Supp. IV 1974).
121. Under the housing programs in existence at the time the district court
entered its original remedial order against HUD, the local housing au-
thorities and city governments had to make application to HUD for
funds or to approve the use of funds in their jurisdiction before HUD
could grant any funds. 42 U.S.C. § 1415(7) (b) (1970); 42 U.S.C. §
1421b (a) (2) (1970). Even under these laws an order directed solely
at HUD would not force the housing authorities or local governments
to apply for assistance under the programs but only would apply to
HUD's already existing duty of determining whether or not to grant
any funds.
Under the new regulations HUD is permitted to select the geo-
graphic areas where housing is to be constructed. 24 C.F.R. § 880.203
(1975). It is directed that "the site shall promote greater choice of
housing opportunities and avoid undue concentration of assisted per-
sons in areas containing a high proportion of low-income persons." 24
C.F.R. § 880.112(d) (1975). HUD contracts to make payments to local
public housing agencies or to private owners of housing units for the
purpose of making up the difference between the fair market value
of the rent and that amount actually contributed by the low-income
tenant. The low-income family pays between 15% and 25% of its
gross income for rent. 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (c) (3) (Supp. IV 1974).
However, the Act does allow local governments the right to com-
ment on the application. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1439(a)-1439(c) (Supp. IV
1974). The Act directs HUD to allow the local governmental entity 30
days to comment on an as yet unapproved housing plan proposal and
30 days in which to object to an approved proposal on the ground it is
inconsistent with the local government's housing plan. Even if an ob-
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Local government approval is no longer a prerequisite to an appli-
cation for funding. An order directed exclusively to HUD will
not force any unwilling municipality to apply for assistance under
these programs, but will merely assist HUD in carrying out its
duties under the federal housing laws. 1 22  The Court concluded
that a HUD program of expanding low-income housing opportun-
ities outside areas of minority concentration would not interfere
impermissibly with the operation of the suburban municipalities
because under the section 1437f program the local governmental
units have (1) the right to comment on proposals, (2) the right to
reject certain proposals inconsistent with their own adopted hous-
ing assistance plans, and (3) the right to require that zoning and
other land use restrictions are adhered to by builders. 23 The right
of the local governments to block public housing proposals depends
upon their housing plans and zoning laws.
In summary the Court stated:
[T]here is no basis for the petitioners' claim that court-ordered
metropolitan relief in this case would be impermissible as a matter
of law under the Milliken decision. In contrast to the desegregation
order in that case, a metropolitan relief order directed to HUD
would not consolidate or in any way restructure local governmental
units. The remedial decree would neither force suburban govern-
ments to submit public housing proposals to HUD nor displace
the rights and powers accorded local government entities under
federal or state housing statutes or existing land-use laws. The
order would have the same effect on the suburban governments
as a discretionary decision by HUD to use its statutory powers to
provide the respondents with alternatives to the racially segregated
Chicago public housing system created by CHA and HUD.124
jection is filed, HUD can approve the proposal if it feels it is consistent
with the housing assistance plan. HUD will look to see if the housing
assistance plan properly provides for the present and future needs of
low-income persons and whether it "promot[es] greater choice of
housing opportunities and avoid[s] undue concentrations of assisted
persons." 42 U.S.C. § 5304(a) (4) (C) (ii) (Supp. IV 1974). It is pos-
sible that the location of subsidized housing in predominately white
areas of suburban municipalities may be consistent with the com-
munity housing-assistance plans.
122. 425 U.S. at 303.
123. Id. at 305.
124. Id. at 305-06. Justices Brennan and White joined Justice Marshall
in a concurring opinion. Justice Stevens did not participate. Justice
Marshall stated:
I dissented in Milliken .... and I continue to believe that
the Court's decision in that case unduly limited the federal
courts' broad equitable power to provide effective remedies for
official segregation. In this case the Court distinguishes Milli-
ken and paves the way for a remedial decree directing the
Department of Housing and Urban Development to utilize its
DISCRIMINATION
IV. CONCLUSION
It has been stated that "[f] or better or worse, both by legis-
lative act and judicial decision, this nation is committed to a policy
of balanced and dispersed public housing.' 25 Gautreaux has re-
affirmed this commitment to responsible public housing policy.
The Court's recognition that HUD's conduct reinforced the con-
centration of low-income and minority populations in the core
area of Chicago is a significant foundation for society to begin to
deal realistically with the multitude of problems associated with
segregated housing patterns. Gautreaux affirmatively established
that Milliken did not bar metropolitan area-wide relief per se in a
public housing context to remedy the past and future effects of
racially discriminatory housing plans.
Gautreaux spoke broadly to the issue of providing low-income
and minority groups with greater opportunities for access to de-
segregated public housing, but this broadness creates a number of
problems which must be resolved before the policy of dispersed
public housing can be applied effectively. The primary problem
as evidenced by Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing De-
velopment Corp., 26 is that Gautreaux did not address the issue
concerning local zoning laws which effectively limit public hous-
ing to less affluent suburban areas. Municipal zoning laws which
zone out public housing units remain fully intact and effective.
Another major problem is that Gautreaux applies only to situations
where a constitutional violation has been found. Although HUD
already possesses the authority to operate within the entire metro-
politan area of large cities, there are not any remedial orders di-
recting HUD to take affirmative action in any other cities.
Gautreaux has practical application only where it can be proven
that HUD has fostered and assisted in the development of a racially
discriminatory public housing pattern. Furthermore, Gautreaux
leaves unanswered the question of whether a metropolitan area
remedy would be permissible where the local housing authority
lacked statutory authority to operate outside of its own boundaries.
In Gautreaux, one of the main reasons for upholding the permissi-
bility of a metropolitan area remedial plan was the fact that both
full statutory power to foster housing projects in white areas
of the greater Chicago metropolitan area. I join the Court's
opinion except insofar as it appears to reaffirm the decision
in Milliken.
Id. at 306-07. For discussion of Justices Brennan, White and Mar-
shall's dissenting opinions in Milliken, see note 77 supra.
125. 332 F. Supp. at 390.
126. 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977). See note 1 supra.
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CHA and HUD had statutory authority to contract for the location
of public housing within the entire metropolitan area.
Despite these probable limitations, Gautreaux recognized that
federal courts have the obligation to enforce the rights of all citizens
to equal access to housing. The positive result of the decision is
the declaration that arbitrarily drawn governmental boundaries
will not prevent metropolitan area relief where a constitutional
violation is found. Gautreaux also offers the potential for future
administrative and legislative action. The determination that the
relevant housing market in a city is the entire metropolitan area
presents a progressive premise from which HUD may operate and
on which Congress may build. The Court's dedication to the de-
concentration of low-income and minority groups and to the Hous-
ing and Community Development Act of 1974 are tools through
which the federal government can keep the promise of equal rights
made in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Paul E. Hofmeister '78
